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DETERMINING THE LOCATION OF INJURY FOR NEW 
YORK’S LONG ARM STATUTE IN AN INFRINGEMENT 
CLAIM 
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK 
Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. American Buddha1 
(decided March 24, 2011) 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Internet’s explosive growth has pressed the courts to ad-
dress novel issues and revisit some well-settled ones.2  In particular, 
the Internet’s universal accessibility and revolutionary communica-
tion capabilities have necessitated the development of new mecha-
nisms to determine jurisdiction.3  Additionally, doubt has been cast 
over the effectiveness of copyright and trademark protections, as the 
Internet has contributed to dramatic increases in infringement.4  As a 
result, courts seem intent on focusing on the Internet in personal ju-
risdiction and copyright infringement analyses, thereby shifting atten-
tion from important factors and leaving some issues unsettled.5 
A recent decision by the New York Court of Appeals, Pen-
 
1 946 N.E.2d 159 (N.Y. 2011). 
2 See Ottinger v. Non-Party The Journal News, No. 08-03892, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 
4579, *3 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (“The [I]nternet is creating emerging legal issues, from jurisdiction 
to discovery.”). 
3 See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1265 (6th Cir. 1996) (discussing the 
Internet and minimum contacts); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 
1123 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (discussing personal jurisdiction and the Internet); Bensusan Rest. 
Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (testing website for jurisdiction). 
4 See generally Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 300 (examining the Internet and trademark in-
fringement); Penguin, 946 N.E.2d at 163 (discussing the Internet’s role in a copyright in-
fringement claim). 
5 See Chloé v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158, 167 (2d Cir. 2010) (find-
ing a website less important than a shipment into the state); see also Christian M. Rieder & 
Stacy P. Pappas, Personal Jurisdiction for Copyright Infringement on the Internet, 38 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 367, 377 (1998) (“Despite all the concern . . . laws regarding personal juris-
diction are more than suitable to adapt to the needs of the Internet in the context of copyright 
infringement cases.”). 
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guin Group (USA) Inc. v. American Buddha, illustrates a situation in 
which the court emphasized the Internet in a personal jurisdiction 
analysis for a copyright infringement case.6  The issue was whether 
“[i]n copyright infringement cases involving the uploading of a . . . 
literary work onto the Internet, . . . the situs of injury for purposes of 
determining long-arm jurisdiction . . . [is] the location of the infring-
ing action or the location of the principal place of business of the 
copyright holder[.]”7  The court held that the location of injury is the 
copyright holder’s principal place of business.8  But, the court refor-
mulated the inquiry and limited its holding only to cases in which the 
alleged infringement was an unconsented uploading of a work to the 
Internet.9 
After a review of the case, this Note argues that the court’s 
holding in Penguin was correct, but the court’s reformulation of the 
issue to apply only to cases of unconsented uploading of copyrighted 
works to the Internet was unnecessary.  First, this Note explores a 
typical personal jurisdiction analysis with a focus on the multilayered 
consideration of the Internet frequently needed to meet the federal re-
quirements and New York’s long-arm statute’s safeguards.  This 
frames the issue faced by the court in Penguin and shows that the 
court’s consideration of the Internet was duplicative.  Second, this 
Note analyzes federal copyright law, focusing first on the traditional 
concepts underlying copyright and then on the Internet’s effect on 
those concepts.  This analysis indicates that, due to the nature of a 
copyright, infringement causes injury in the holder’s domicile and the 
Internet’s role in copyright infringement cases has not changed the 
traditional notion of injury.  Third, this Note compares the closely re-
lated laws of trademark and copyright, which reveal similarities that 
welcome the application of Penguin to trademark cases in the future; 
but this comparison also reveals significant distinctions, especially 
regarding the Internet. 
II.  THE OPINION: PENGUIN GROUP (USA) INC. V. AMERICAN 
BUDDHA 
Penguin Group (USA) Inc. (hereinafter “Penguin”) filed suit 
 
6 Penguin, 946 N.E.2d at 163-64. 
7 Id. at 161. 
8 Id. at 165. 
9 Id. at 165 n.5. 
2
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in the Southern District of New York against American Buddha 
(hereinafter “Buddha”), alleging copyright infringement.10  Penguin 
claimed that Buddha infringed on four of Penguin’s copyrights by up-
loading complete versions of copyrighted books onto two Internet 
websites for public access, along with an assurance to users that 
downloading was legally permissible.11  Buddha, incorporated in Or-
egon with its principal place of business in Arizona, uploaded the 
protected works in Arizona and Oregon, where its servers storing the 
digital data were located.12  Buddha moved to dismiss for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction.13  Penguin asserted that personal jurisdiction was 
proper pursuant to New York’s long-arm statute, Civil Practice Law 
and Rules (“CPLR”) 302(a)(3)(ii), which provides jurisdiction over 
nondomiciliary defendants who committed a tort outside the state that 
caused a foreseeable injury within the state.14  The trial court granted 
Buddha’s motion, holding Penguin’s injury was purely economic and 
did not occur in-state because its only connection to New York was 
Penguin’s domicile.15  Although the trial court noted that the Internet 
could complicate the determination, it held the Internet did not do so 
here because the uploading occurred outside New York.16 
On appeal, the Second Circuit certified a question to the New 
York Court of Appeals because of a split among the federal district 
courts and the lack of governing authority from the Supreme Court or 
New York Court of Appeals: “In copyright infringement cases, is the 
situs of injury for purposes of determining long-arm jurisdiction un-
der CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) the location of the infringing action or the 
residence or location of the principal place of business of the copy-
right holder?”17  The Court of Appeals reformulated the question to 
specify and limit inquiry only into copyright infringement cases in-
volving the digital uploading of a protected work to the Internet.18  
 
10 Id. at 160. 
11 Penguin, 946 N.E.2d at 160. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 161. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Penguin, 946 N.E.2d at 161. 
17 Id.  In fact, there is  a division as to the location of injury for infringement of all intel-
lectual property.  See Andy Stroud, Inc. v. Brown, No. 08 CIV. 8246(HB), 2009 WL 
539863, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2009) (“[T]here appears to be significant disagreement . . . 
regarding the locus of an injury in intellectual property cases.”). 
18 Penguin, 946 N.E.2d at 161 (“[B]ecause the Internet plays a significant role in this case, 
we narrow and reformulate the certified question . . . .”). 
3
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Although adding only one element to the question, the unconsented 
uploading to the Internet, the Court of Appeals drastically altered the 
question and its answer’s inevitable implications. 
To begin its analysis, the Court of Appeals explained that 
New York’s long-arm statute contains a provision that confers juris-
diction over a nonresident defendant who commits a tort outside of 
New York State causing a foreseeable injury within the state, under 
CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii).19  Of CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii)’s five elements, the tri-
al court found element three dispositive and did not examine the oth-
er four.20  Therefore, the only issue on appeal, and the only subject of 
the certified question, was the third element: an injury suffered in-
state.21 
To determine the applicable rule, the court examined three 
commercial tort cases in which a plaintiff asserted jurisdiction under 
CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii).22  The first was Fantis Foods, Inc. v. Standard 
Importing Co.,23 in which a New York corporation filed suit against a 
 
19 Id. (“CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) . . . provides jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries who commit 
tortious acts outside the state that result in injuries within New York.”).  Specifically, it pro-
vides: 
(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction.  As to a cause of action aris-
ing from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise 
personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or admin-
istrator, who in person or through an agent: . . . 
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or 
property within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of 
character arising from the act, if he . . . 
 (ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in 
the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international 
commerce . . . . 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a) (McKinney 2012).  LaMarca v. Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 735 N.E.2d 883, 
886 (N.Y. 2000) (enumerating the five elements required for a plaintiff to invoke this provi-
sion of the statute: (1) the defendant committed a tortious act out-of-state, (2) the act resulted 
in the claim, (3) the act caused an injury in-state, (4) the defendant should have reasonably 
foreseen the injury, and (5) the defendant conducts substantial interstate commerce). 
20 Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 609 F.3d 30, 41 (2d Cir. 2010), certifying 
question to 946 N.E.2d 159 (N.Y. 2011). 
21 Penguin, 946 N.E.2d at 162.  On remand, Penguin’s claim was dismissed for failure to 
satisfy the fifth element: the defendant must derive substantial interstate revenue.  Penguin 
Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, No. 09 Civ. 528(RA), 2013 WL 865486, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 7, 2013). 
22 See generally Penguin, 946 N.E.2d at 162-64 (discussing Fantis Foods, Inc. v. Standard 
Importing Co., 402 N.E.2d 122 (N.Y. 1980), Sybron Corp. v. Wetzel, 385 N.E.2d 1055 
(N.Y. 1978), and Am. Eutectic Welding Alloys Sales Co. v. Dytron Alloys Corp., 439 F.2d 
428 (2d Cir. 1971)). 
23 402 N.E.2d 122 (N.Y. 1980). 
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company incorporated and with its principal place of business in 
Greece, seeking money damages for conversion and trademark in-
fringement.24  After agreeing to deliver to the plaintiff a particular 
shipment of feta cheese, which the plaintiff had inspected and 
stamped with its trademark, the defendant sold the shipment to one of 
the plaintiff’s competitors.25  Because the agreement was made out-
side New York, the Court of Appeals held that economic injury to a 
state citizen alone does not constitute the requisite in-state injury; a 
more direct injury is required.26 
Second, the court examined Sybron Corp. v. Wetzel,27 in 
which a New York manufacturing corporation filed unfair competi-
tion and misappropriation of trade secret claims against a competitor, 
a Delaware corporation based in New Jersey, seeking to enjoin the 
defendant from hiring one of the plaintiff’s former employees to pre-
vent the disclosure of trade secrets.28  Although the alleged injury 
was only anticipated economic loss and no actual loss had yet oc-
curred, the Court of Appeals deemed the anticipated and inevitable 
loss of important customers in New York an in-state injury.29 
Third, the court looked to American Eutectic Welding Alloys 
Sales Co. v. Dytron Alloys Corp.,30 in which, similar to Sybron, a 
New York corporation sought to enjoin a former employee and a 
New Jersey competitor from using or disclosing confidential trade in-
formation.31  However, unlike Sybron, where the plaintiff had not suf-
fered actual economic loss yet, here the plaintiff had lost customers 
predominantly in Kentucky and Pennsylvania, but not New York.32  
The Second Circuit dismissed the case, holding the actual loss of out-
of-state customers rendered the plaintiff’s domicile irrelevant in de-
termining the location of injury.33 
After examining these cases, the court found Sybron to be 
closest to and most instructive for Penguin, even though Penguin 
 
24 Id. at 123. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 126. 
27 385 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 1978). 
28 Id. at 1055-56. 
29 Id. at 1059. 
30 439 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1971). 
31 Id. at 430. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 433 (“[T]here would be no jurisdiction . . . because the places where plaintiffs 
‘lost business’ were all out of New York.”). 
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never alleged any anticipated actual economic loss in New York.34  In 
drawing its conclusion, the court focused on two factors.35  First, the 
court emphasized the role of the Internet in the infringing conduct.36  
The court stated that increased protection from digital Internet piracy 
infringement was necessary due to developments of digital technolo-
gy, which make pirating copyrighted works less expensive and easi-
er.37  In addition, the Internet’s universal accessibility complicates the 
determination of the actual location of injury because the locations 
where users access the website and protected works are not easily, if 
ever, ascertainable.38  The court even declared the location of the up-
loading inconsequential.39 
Second, the court focused on copyright’s special bundle of 
rights.40  The court pointed out that certain rights, such as the right to 
reproduce a work or grant or deny licenses to reproduce a work, do 
not necessarily preserve profits but encourage creativity and the pro-
duction of new works.41  Based on these rights, courts have found in-
jury without a showing of actual economic loss.42  Thus, the location 
of lost profits was less important.  In support, the court showed that 
claims of copyright infringement frequently result in an injunction, 
regardless of specific economic loss.43  The court held that the loca-
tion of injury, for purposes of the in-state injury requirement of 
CPLR 302(a)(ii), in cases of copyright infringement, based on the up-
loading of a New York copyright holder’s protected work to the In-
ternet, is New York.44  The plaintiff must allege a copyright in-
fringement and that infringement must be the digital uploading of a 
protected work to the Internet.45  The court made clear that the deci-
sion did not apply to copyright infringement cases absent Internet 
 
34 Penguin, 946 N.E.2d at 165 (“[T]hese two elements . . . lead[] us to view this case as 
closer to Sybron than Fantis Foods.”). 
35 Id. at 163 (stating that “the convergence of [these] two factors persuades” its decision). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 164. 
39 Penguin, 946 N.E.2d at 164 (“[T]he place of uploading is inconsequential . . . .”). 
40 Id. (“The second critical factor . . . derives from the unique bundle of rights granted to 
copyright owners.”). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. (quoting Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2009)). 
43 Id. at 165. 
44 Penguin, 946 N.E.2d at 165. 
45 Id. (emphasis added) (stressing the importance of the presence of both Internet piracy 
and copyright infringement). 
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transmission.46 
The court rejected Buddha’s claim that the decision would 
yield a Pandora’s box, citing built-in personal jurisdiction safeguards: 
the requirements that defendants reasonably anticipate causing the in-
jury, conduct substantial interstate business, and have sufficient min-
imum contacts with the forum to comport with due process.47  Thus, 
the court in Penguin relied on the Internet’s role in piracy of copy-
righted works, the special bundle of rights for copyright holders, and 
the safeguards in New York’s long-arm statute and federal personal 
jurisdiction requirements. 
III.  FEDERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND NEW YORK 
STATE’S LONG-ARM STATUTE 
A brief discussion of personal jurisdiction provides the neces-
sary context for the issue in Penguin and demonstrates that state and 
federal safeguards not only limit a Pandora’s box of infringement 
suits, as the court stated, but also respond to the court’s concerns re-
garding the Internet.  Thus, because the court in Penguin must inevi-
tably consider the Internet’s role at particular points of its analysis, 
this Note addresses the court’s vague concern over the role of the In-
ternet. 
Personal jurisdiction is rooted in the conflicting constitutional 
interests of individual due process rights and state sovereignty.48  The 
 
46 Id. at 165 n.5 (“We do not . . . address whether a New York copyright holder sustains 
an in-state injury pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) in a copyright infringement case that does 
not allege digital piracy and, therefore, express no opinion on that question . . . .”). 
47 Id. at 165.  In fact, on remand, the Southern District of New York dismissed Penguin’s 
claim for failing to prove that Buddha conducted sufficient interstate business, despite win-
ning this appeal.  Penguin, 2013 WL 865486, at *4. 
48 See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786-87 (2011) (“The Due 
Process Clause protects an individual’s right to be deprived of life, liberty, or property only 
by the exercise of lawful power. . . .  This is no less true with respect to the power of a sov-
ereign to resolve disputes through judicial process . . . .”).  The Constitution requires each 
state to honor the judgments of other state courts, but the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Pro-
cess Clause protects defendants from judgments issued by courts in states that are deemed 
unreasonably unfair.  See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd., v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano 
Cnty., 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
limits the power of a state court to exert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defend-
ant.”); see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) 
(“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of a state court to 
render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident defendant.  A judgment rendered in 
violation of due process is void . . . and is not entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere.”) 
(citations omitted).  A judgment is valid only if the court had personal jurisdiction over the 
7
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Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington49 established 
the modern personal jurisdiction doctrine.  For the first time, jurisdic-
tion was upheld over a nonresident defendant who had not been 
served within the forum.50  Substantially expanding the grounds for 
personal jurisdiction, the new test focused on the nature, quality, and 
quantity of the defendant’s relationship to the forum state.51  The de-
fendant must have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum, such 
that a court’s exercise of authority is fair and reasonable.52  Those 
contacts dictate the extent of the court’s jurisdictional authority.53 
Over time, the minimum contacts test evolved with develop-
ments in technology and interstate business.  Now, even a single con-
tact may be sufficient for related claims.54  To preserve fairness and 
reasonableness, tenuous contacts suffice only if “the defendant pur-
posefully avail[ed] itself of the privileges of conducting activities 
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protection of 
its laws,”55 or the defendant “reasonably anticipate[d] being haled in-
to court there.”56  Reasonable anticipation is met if a defendant 
“reached out” to the forum57 or acted intentionally to harm a particu-
 
defendant.  Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal. In and For City and Cnty. of S.F., 436 U.S. 84, 
91 (1978). 
49 326 U.S. 310 (1945).  The Supreme Court first established the doctrine in 1877 in its 
seminal decision of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).  At that time, the enforceability of 
in personam court judgments was limited to those issued against defendants that were citi-
zens of or were served within the state.  Id. at 733. 
50 See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (stating that “presence within the territorial jurisdiction 
of court was [a] prerequisite” for a court to enter a valid judgment against a defendant). 
51 Id. at 319. 
52 Id. at 316 (“[D]ue process requires . . . certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such 
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice.’ ”) (citations omitted). 
53 Pervasive contacts with a state provide the courts with general jurisdiction, meaning 
those courts may adjudicate all claims against that defendant, whereas continuous but lim-
ited contacts establish specific jurisdiction, which limits jurisdiction to claims that arise from 
the defendant’s contacts.  Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318.  The latter is the focus of this Note. 
54 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (describing progress in communica-
tions that “has made the defense of a suit in a foreign tribunal less burdensome”); see also 
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (“[I]ncrease in the amount of busi-
ness conducted by mail across state lines . . . [and] modern transportation and communica-
tion have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a [foreign] 
State . . . .”). 
55 Id. at 253.  “The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonres-
ident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State.”  Id. 
56 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
57 Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985). 
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lar state resident.58 
The adaptability of the minimum contacts test was particular-
ly challenged by the capabilities of communicating and conducting 
business across state lines without leaving the office, let alone the 
state, simply by using the Internet.59  Early Internet personal jurisdic-
tion decisions varied considerably and, at times, were illogical in 
light of traditional considerations; while some courts held that a de-
fendant’s Internet activity constituted grounds for jurisdiction in all 
states,60 others held that it did not establish jurisdiction in any state.61  
And still other courts held that a defendant’s Internet activity must 
result in a relationship to the forum to establish jurisdiction with only 
that specific state.62 
These inconsistent decisions were reconciled in Zippo Mfg. 
Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,63 which provided the current framework 
of Internet based personal jurisdiction in the form of a sliding scale 
based on website interactivity and reasonable foreseeability.64  At one 
extreme are interactive websites, which allow users to transmit digital 
information.65  These websites inherently provide minimum con-
 
58 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (Because the defendants were “primary par-
ticipants in an alleged wrongdoing intentionally directed at a [forum state’s] resident, . . . 
jurisdiction over them is proper on that basis.”). 
59 Zippo Mfg., 952 F. Supp. at 1123. 
60 See Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996) 
(holding that an Internet advertisement which used another’s trademark and provided a na-
tional toll-free phone number for customers established jurisdiction in all states); see also 
Martiz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (noting drawbacks 
of comparing the Internet to mail or telephone, and upholding jurisdiction in all states based 
on the defendant’s Internet advertisement and intention to use the advertisement to start a 
national mailing list). 
61 See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301 (holding that a defendant’s advertisement, which 
improperly used another’s trademark, did not constitute purposeful availment or reaching out 
to the forum because no particular state was targeted). 
62 See Panavision Intern., L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 621-22 (C.D. Cal. 1996) 
(holding jurisdiction was proper over a defendant who intentionally infringed on a citizen of 
the forum’s trademark on the Internet and attempted to derive a benefit from the forum); see 
also CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1268 (finding jurisdiction over a defendant who advertised and 
sold its product via the plaintiff’s website because its business relationships within the forum 
developed through the advertisement constituted purposeful availment to the forum state, but 
not all states). 
63 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
64 Id. at 1124 (“[T]he likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exer-
cised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity 
conducts over the Internet.”). 
65 Id. 
9
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tacts.66  At the opposite extreme are passive websites that only unilat-
erally offer information, which do not establish sufficient minimum 
contacts.67  Websites in the middle of the spectrum are evaluated by 
their interactivity and commercial nature.68  Today, the Zippo sliding 
scale is controlling in most jurisdictions,69 and has been incorporated 
in many other jurisdictions’ own tests;70 only a small minority has 
failed to adopt the Zippo test.71 
Due to the expansions of personal jurisdiction over out-of-
state defendants in the federal approach, states enacted statutes, 
which provide specific personal jurisdiction requirements for their 
courts.72  Most long-arm statutes act as additional limitations on judi-
cial exercise of authority over nonresidents, such as New York’s 
CPLR 302.73  Thus, a non-domiciliary is amenable to jurisdiction in 
New York only if, first, CPLR 302 confers authority on the court, and 
second, exercise of jurisdiction comports with federal due process.74 
New York courts, pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(3), are generally 




68 Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. 
69 See Emily Ekland, Comment, Scaling Back Zippo: The Downside to the Zippo Sliding 
Scale and Proposed Alternatives to Its Uses, 5 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 380, 384 (2012) (“Most 
circuits have applied this test . . . .”); see, e.g., Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 
414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997) (adopting Zippo’s sliding scale); Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 
F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying Zippo’s sliding scale); Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen 
Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 890 (6th Cir. 2002) (applying the Zippo test). 
70 Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 252 (2d Cir. 2007) (applying Zippo only 
to determine if the defendant had purposefully availed itself or conducted business within the 
state). 
71 See, e.g., Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(refusing to apply Zippo). 
72 Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reineckle, Inc., 209 N.E.2d 68, 72 (N.Y. 
1965).  Long-arm statutes govern both federal and state courts.  The Design Tex Grp., Inc. v. 
U.S. Vinyl Mfg. Corp., No. 04 Civ. 5002(JSR), 2005 WL 357125, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 
2005). 
73 Longines-Wittnauer, 209 N.E.2d at 72. 
74 LaMarca, 735 N.E.2d at 886.  CPLR 302’s four subsections enumerate the only claims 
New York courts may adjudicate over noncitizens.  Of the four subsections, this Note  fo-
cuses exclusively on subsection (a).  Subsection (b) governs marital disputes; subsection (c) 
provides that defendants amendable to CPLR 302 jurisdiction are not amenable to any 
claims that are unrelated to its contacts with the state; and subsection (d) governs foreign 
defamation judgments.  N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 2012).  Courts have traditionally con-
strued CPLR 302 more narrowly than the Constitution permits.  See Longines-Wittnauer, 
209 N.E.2d at 68 (holding CPLR 302 did not confer jurisdiction when the federal require-
ments were met); see also Kramer v. Vogl, 215 N.E.2d 159, 161-62 (N.Y. 1966) (holding 
CPLR 302 did not apply to contracts when required minimum contacts were present). 
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acts outside of the state.75  CPLR 302(a)(3) requires a showing that: 
(1) the defendant committed a tortious act out-of-state, (2) the act re-
sulted in the claim, (3) the act caused an injury in-state, (4) the de-
fendant should have reasonably foreseen the injury, and (5) the de-
fendant conducts substantial interstate commerce.76  Thus, the court’s 
inquiry in Penguin considered only one of the five necessary ele-
ments required by New York’s applicable long-arm provision; the 
court did not hold or even inquire if jurisdiction was proper.77 
The first element, commission of a tortious act outside the 
state, is met by any claim other than breach of contract,78 which the 
courts have excluded, or defamation, which the statute excludes.79  
The location of a defendant when it accesses the Internet is the loca-
tion of the tortious act for torts facilitated by the Internet.80  The se-
cond element requires “an articulable nexus[] or a substantial rela-
tionship” between the plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s conduct 
that indicates the defendant caused the injury.81 
Because the addition of CPLR 302(a)(3) increased the courts’ 
ability to establish jurisdiction over defendants with only tenuous 
contacts with the state, the two final elements were enacted as safe-
guards to ensure it is “reasonable to require the defendant to come to 
New York to answer for tortious conduct committed elsewhere.”82  
The Internet is frequently a factor in the courts’ treatment of these 
safeguards,83 as it was for the district court after the remand of Pen-
 
75 Longines-Wittnauer, 209 N.E.2d at 77. 
76 LaMarca, 735 N.E.2d at 886. 
77 See Lang v. Morris, 823 F. Supp. 2d 966, 975 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (noting the Court of 
Appeals did not determine personal jurisdiction in Penguin, but merely found in-state inju-
ry). 
78 Fantis Foods, 402 N.E.2d at 124 (holding CPLR 302(a) excludes breach of contract 
suits); Amigo Foods Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, 348 N.E.2d 581, 584 (N.Y. 1976) 
(“[No] breach of a contract . . . may form a basis for long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 
302 . . . .”). 
79 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3). 
80 See ISI Brands, Inc. v. KCC Int’l, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 2d 81, 89 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(“Courts have held that . . . the tort is committed where the website is created and/or main-
tained.”); see also Rescuecom Corp. v. Hyams, 477 F. Supp. 2d 522, 532 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(“[P]laintiff has not made a prima facie showing that defendant . . . engaged in commercial 
[I]nternet activity such as would amount to commission of a tortious act in New York under 
CPLR 302(a)(2).  Rather, . . . any tortious conduct in connection with the website occurred 
in Texas.”). 
81 Best Van Lines, 490 F.3d at 246 (quoting Henderson v. I.N.S., 157 F.3d 106, 123). 
82 Ingraham v. Carroll, 687 N.E.2d 1293, 1295 (N.Y. 1997). 
83 See, e.g., Energy Brands Inc. v. Spiritual Brands, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 2d 458, 471 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[I]t was reasonably foreseeable that publication of web sites with the of-
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guin’s claim.84  First, to find the requisite foreseeability, a defend-
ant’s Internet activity must manifest intent to target New York in 
some way or reveal facts that should have alerted the defendant to the 
possibility of being called into a New York court.85  Although this 
test, which requires a higher standard than the Zippo test, is more dif-
ficult to satisfy, the two analyses are generally based on the same 
facts.86 
Second, courts often look to the commercial nature of the de-
fendant’s Internet activity to establish the interstate commerce re-
quirement in order to protect defendants engaged in purely local ac-
tivities.87  Thus, some courts do not require interstate revenue or sales 
if the defendant is clearly not engaged in local events.88  For example, 
an Internet advertisement without sale does not satisfy the interstate 
commerce safeguard, and a single shipment to New York, even if 
generated via the Internet, is insufficient to constitute transacting 
business in New York,89 but a combination of both satisfies the inter-
state business safeguard.90 
However, other courts, such as the Southern District in Pen-
guin II, strictly interpret the interstate commerce safeguard and re-
 
fending marks would have consequences in New York.” (quoting Citigroup Inc. v. City 
Holding Co., 97 F. Supp. 2d 549, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
84 See Penguin, 2013 WL 865486, at *4 n.7 (noting Internet activity would have satisfied 
the foreseeability safeguard and was a factor, although insufficient on its own, in analyzing 
the interstate revenue requirement). 
85 See, e.g., Energy Brands, 571 F. Supp. 2d at 471 (finding reasonable foreseeability be-
cause defendant’s use of plaintiff’s trademark would deceive New York customers); but see 
Digiprotect USA Corp. v. Does 1-266, No. 10 Civ. 8759(TPG), 2011 WL 1466073, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2011) (holding download of film via the Internet caused an in-state injury 
to a New York copyright holder, but denied jurisdiction because defendant’s single down-
load did not meet the foreseeability requirement); Royalty Network Inc. v. Dishant.com, 
LLC, 638 F. Supp. 2d 410, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (dismissing an infringement claim for lack 
of foreseeability because an Indian company, not a New York company, appeared to hold the 
copyright in the music which was uploaded to the Internet). 
86 Best Van Lines, 490 F.3d at 252 (“[T]he Zippo sliding scale of interactivity may help 
frame the jurisdictional inquiry in some cases, as the district court here pointed out, ‘[but] it 
does not amount to a separate framework for analyzing [I]nternet-based jurisdiction.’ ” 
(quoting Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker,  No. 03 Civ. 6585(GEL), 2004 WL 964009, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2004))). 
87 See Light v. Taylor, 317 F. App’x 82, 84 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding an unconsented up-
loading of a New York copyright holder’s photograph to the Internet constituted an out-of-
state tort which caused an in-state injury, but it did not generate sufficient revenue to meet 
interstate commerce requirement). 
88 LaMarca, 735 N.E.2d at 886-87; Ingraham, 687 N.E.2d at 1296. 
89 Light, 317 F. App’x at 84. 
90 Chloé, 616 F.3d at 171. 
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quire defendants to actually generate substantial revenue.91  Thus, as 
interstate business is increasingly conducted on the Internet, a de-
fendant’s Internet activity is frequently the focus for meeting these 
traditional safeguard requirements. 
The third requirement, an in-state injury, is the least settled of 
CPLR 302’s elements and has been the source of the greatest disa-
greement among the courts.92  The courts consider the location of the 
“original event” as the location of injury, not the location of resultant 
damage.93  This requires distinguishing the “original event” from any 
lingering injury and the tortious act that caused the injury, equating 
injury to the “first effect.”94  However, these distinctions are not al-
ways clear; for example, in some medical malpractice cases if the 
first physical injury to a plaintiff’s person manifested in-state from a 
medical procedure conducted outside of the state, the injury is 
deemed to occur in-state, but in other similar cases the injury is 
deemed to occur where the procedure was conducted.95  In addition, 
because each claim carries its own distinct notion of injury, the first 
effect for each claim is unique.96  Unlike medical malpractice, unfair 
competition is designed to protect a plaintiff’s economic interests 
 
91 See Penguin, 2013 WL 865486, at *5 (stating revenue may be substantial either on its 
face or as a percentage of the defendant’s revenue, but that slightly more than two thousand 
dollars, even as the defendant’s total sales, was insufficient to satisfy the interstate revenue 
requirement). 
92 See Sybron, 385 N.E.2d at 1058 (“The more difficult question is whether the out-of-
State acts . . . will result in injury in New York . . . .”); Ingraham, 687 N.E.2d at 1299 
(“[T]he locus of injury . . . is more of an open question . . . .”). 
93 See Fantis Foods, 402 N.E.2d at 126 (stating the original event test comports with the 
Constitution); see also Carte v. Parkoff, 543 N.Y.S.2d 718, 719 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1989) 
(“[T]he situs of the injury is the location of the original event . . . [and] not the location 
where the resultant damages are subsequently felt by the plaintiff . . . .”) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Ingraham, 687 N.E.2d at 1299-1300 (Bellacosa, J., dis-
senting) (urging the court to relax the original event standard); see also Reyes v. Sanchez-
Pena, 742 N.Y.S.2d 513, 520-21 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (declining to apply the original event test). 
94 See DiStefano v. Carozzi N. Am., Inc., 286 F.3d 81, 84-85 (2d Cir. 2001) (“ ‘This ‘orig-
inal event’ is, however, generally distinguished not only from the initial tort but from the 
final economic injury and the felt consequences of the tort.’ . . .  [I]n applying N.Y. C.P.L.R. 
§ 302(a)(3) that the ‘original event’ occurs ‘where the first effect of the tort . . . that ultimate-
ly produced the final economic injury’ is located.”) (alteration in original) (citations omit-
ted). 
95 Compare Reyes, 742 N.Y.S.2d at 525-26 (holding injury occurred in New York because 
effect of out-of-state medical treatment manifested in New York), with Vaichunas v. Tonyes, 
877 N.Y.S.2d 204, 204-05 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2009) (holding injury occurred in New Jer-
sey, despite subsequent medical treatment in New York). 
96 See Penguin, 946 N.E.2d at 164 (evaluating facts in light of copyright infringement 
claim). 
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and, accordingly, the requisite in-state injury is met upon a showing 
of lost revenue or customers within the state.97  Distinction between 
the first effect and the resultant harm is especially difficult in copy-
right infringement cases, like Penguin.  Therefore, an in depth analy-
sis of the notion of injury caused by infringement of a copyright is 
necessary to determine the location of Penguin’s injury. 
To establish personal jurisdiction over Buddha, Penguin de-
pended heavily on Buddha’s Internet activity.98  In a sense, the New 
York Court of Appeals  correctly recognized that “the Internet plays a 
significant role in this case,” but it  incorrectly found that the Internet 
played a role in determining the location of Penguin’s injury—
Buddha’s Internet activity is the principal ground for Penguin to sat-
isfy the first element, commission of tortious conduct without the 
state, and the safeguards of reasonable anticipation and substantial in-
terstate revenue.99 
For the first element, the location of the defendant at the time 
of the commission of the tort will be the location of the tortious con-
duct; therefore, because Buddha’s tortious conduct was the uncon-
sented uploading of Penguin’s works to the Internet and those acts 
were committed in either Oregon or Arizona, the first element is 
met.100  For the first safeguard, Buddha’s reasonable anticipation of 
causing harm within New York is proven by Buddha’s website, 
which not only allowed but also solicited users to download Pen-
guin’s copyrighted works.101  And, although New York courts require 
more than the Zippo sliding scale interactivity, Buddha’s conduct in-
dicated that it reasonably anticipated being haled into a New York 
court.102  First, Penguin’s copyright ownership is contained in the no-
tice of copyright affixed to Penguin’s works.103  This is not only ac-
cepted as sufficient notice, but Penguin’s literary works needed to be 
scanned into a computer before being uploaded to the Internet—
Buddha cannot claim to have been unaware of the works’ copyright 
status.  Second, Buddha placed assurances on its website that its users 
 
97 See Am. Eutectic, 439 F.2d at 435 (holding no in-state injury because plaintiff lost cus-
tomers outside of the state). 
98 See Penguin, 2013 WL 865486, at *6. 
99 Id. 
100 Although the court did not make such a holding, Buddha did not contest the first ele-
ment.  Id. at *4. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at *6. 
103 Penguin, 946 N.E.2d at 160. 
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were permitted to download Penguin’s works.104  Thus, Buddha was 
at least aware of, even if it did not concede, the possibility of being 
sued in New York by Penguin, whose copyright notice included its 
New York place of business.  Despite dismissing Penguin’s claim on 
other grounds, the district court on remand indicated in dicta that 
Buddha’s Internet activity, in fact, did satisfy the foreseeability safe-
guard.105 
To meet the second safeguard, Penguin had to show that Bud-
dha derived substantial interstate or international revenue.106  This 
factor, of the five required to satisfy CPLR 302(c), posed the greatest 
challenge to Penguin and was fatal to Penguin’s assertion of jurisdic-
tion.107  Buddha derived just over two thousand dollars in two years 
of operating its websites, emailed users across the country to encour-
age downloading from its website, and provided users with links to 
Amazon, where users could purchase books written by the defend-
ants.108  The court acknowledged that the interstate revenue require-
ment was intended to protect defendants engaged in purely local ac-
tivity and that Buddha’s activity was clearly not purely local, but the 
court interpreted CPLR 302’s language strictly and looked only at 
Buddha’s actual revenue, not Buddha’s commercial nature.109  Rely-
ing on precedent that indicated two thousand dollars was insufficient 
interstate revenue, the court dismissed Penguin’s claim.110  However, 
the court expressed concern about interstate revenue as an effective 
safeguard in light of the Internet’s ubiquitous marketplace.111  The 
court realized that the Internet allows businesses to develop the nec-
essary infrastructures and communications to conduct non-local busi-
ness without the interstate revenue once needed.112 
In addition, Buddha’s website is the primary focus in the fed-
eral analysis under the Zippo sliding scale test developed in response 
to the Internet.  Buddha claimed that its only contact with New York 
was the accessibility of its website, which did not target New York 
 
104 Id. at 160-61. 
105 Penguin, 2013 WL 865486, at *4 n.7. 
106 Id. at *4. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at *2. 
109 Id. 
110 Penguin, 2013 WL 865486, at *5. 
111 Id. at *6. 
112 Id. 
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specifically.113  Therefore, Penguin probably could not have demon-
strated that Buddha purposefully availed itself of the benefits of New 
York’s markets or reached out to the forum state.  However, because 
New York’s reasonable anticipation safeguard is stricter than the 
Zippo test, it is likely that Buddha’s interactive website would consti-
tute sufficient minimum contacts. 
Thus, Internet activity is an important focus of the court in 
satisfying multiple elements of CPLR 302(c).  Further, because the 
Internet has fundamentally altered interstate business, it is likely that 
the legislature or the New York Court of Appeals, as it did in Pen-
guin, will shift focus from a mechanical examination of the quantity 
of revenue to a more realistic scrutiny of a defendant’s local nature.  
Significantly, the Internet is relevant for these elements because it has 
given rise to novel, pertinent facts.  Thus, not only is consideration of 
the Internet repetitive but, as argued, consideration of the Internet is 
irrelevant in establishing the location of injury caused by copyright 
infringement because the Internet has not changed the fundamental 
notion of infringement injury. 
IV.  AN EXAMINATION OF COPYRIGHT AND TRADEMARK LAW IN 
LIGHT OF PENGUIN 
An examination of copyright law is needed to appreciate the 
court’s opinion in Penguin.  This Section provides a background by 
analyzing copyright law’s unique bundle of rights: the protection they 
offer owners, the limitations on those protections, and the remedies 
for their violation.  These core principles show that ownership of a 
copyright in itself suggests that infringement causes injury at the lo-
cation of the holder.  Additionally, this Section compares the core 
concepts of copyright law to those of trademark law.  These compari-
sons reveal similarities that initially suggest Penguin is applicable to 
trademark infringement; however, these comparisons also reveal dis-
tinctions, which indicate the location of injury in trademark infringe-
ment cases is far more complex which ultimately makes application 
of Penguin inappropriate. 
 
113 Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, No. 09 Civ. 528(GEL), 2009 WL 1069158 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2009), vacated, 640 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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A.  Traditional Concepts of Copyright Ownership 
Copyright law, governed by the Copyright Act,114 protects 
“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of ex-
pression . . . .”115  Copyrights allow authors to exclude others from 
using their work by providing a bundle of six fundamental exclusive 
use rights: the right of reproduction, adaption, publication, public per-
formance, public display, and public performance by digital transmis-
sion.116  Copyright’s goal is to encourage creative developments by 
authors for the benefit of society, merely using economic incentive as 
a tool.117  Any violation of a copyright’s bundle of rights gives rise to 
a cause of action for infringement,118 which is proven by two ele-
ments: “(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of” es-
sential elements of the work.119  Generally, registration is a prerequi-
site to instituting an infringement claim.120  Copying is proven by 
evidence that the defendant had access to the protected work or by a 
showing that an alleged copy is so strikingly similar as to support an 
inference of copying, not coincidence.121 
Copyright infringement occurs at the time of copying, regard-
less of that infringement’s economic effect on the owner.122  There-
fore, the focus of copyright infringement suggests the injury it causes 
 
114 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2012). 
115 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012); 1-2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 2.03 (2012).  An author is the originator of a work, and a tangible medium is a 
physical item.  Shira Siskind, Note, Crossing the Fair Use Line: The Demise and Revival of 
the Harry Potter Lexicon and Its Implications for the Fair Use Doctrine in the Real World 
and the Internet, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 291, 294 (2009). 
116 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 
U.S. 539, 546-47 (1985). 
117 See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526, 527 (1994) (stating copyright’s pur-
pose); see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (stating 
copyright law’s goals and mechanisms).  Copyright law’s purpose is stated in the Constitu-
tion’s Patent and Copyright Clause.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the . . . Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive 
Right to their . . . Writings . . . .”).  Copyright law also encourages investment in the arts by 
protecting “work[s] made for hire.”  17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012). 
118 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2012); 18 C.J.S. Copyrights § 64 (2012). 
119 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
120 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2012). 
121 See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 701 (2d Cir. 1992) (dis-
cussing access and similarity); see also Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(“[A]n inference of access may still be established circumstantially by proof of similarity 
which is so striking that the possibilities of independent creation, coincidence and prior 
common source are, as a practical matter, precluded.”). 
122 See NIMMER, supra note 115, at § 8.01 (discussing the time infringement occurs). 
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is not necessarily economic in nature.  Simply an unconsented copy-
ing creates a legally actionable injury; injury does not require an un-
consented work to cause the copyright holder to lose revenue.123  In-
fringement does not require any showing of lost sales, or even a 
showing that the protected work ever generated revenue.124  Moreo-
ver, infringement may discourage a copyright holder from producing 
additional works, not necessarily an economic loss.125  In fact, it is 
possible for copyrighted works to increase in economic value after 
their protection term expires.  And, copyright infringement claims 
have been maintained to preserve control and limit access to a work 
in the absence of economic injury.126 
Thus, the broad rights granted to a copyright owner to exclu-
sively control a work downplay the importance of locating actual 
economic loss, a concern of the court in Penguin.  Moreover, because 
copyright law intends to encourage creativity in authors, it is most 
reasonable to presume injury inherently occurs at the holder’s domi-
cile because that disincentive to produce can only be experienced by 
the author—the first effect of the infringement. 
Furthermore, copyright protection is not limitless, but its limi-
tations reinforce the separation between the notion of infringement 
injury and financial loss.  In terms of subject matter, ideas and facts 
are explicitly excluded from protection to preserve the public’s ac-
cess to them,127 thus avoiding conflict with the First Amendment and 
encouraging development of the arts by authors who utilize those 
ideas or facts.128  In addition, the Copyright Act provides legally 
permissible uses of protected works known as fair use.129  Fair use 
encourages “courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute 
when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law 
is designed to foster.”130  Copyrighted works, in some circumstances, 
may be used for reporting, teaching, criticism, or research.131  There-
 
123 Id. at § 13.01. 
124 Id. 
125 Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 156. 
126 See, e.g., Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd., v. Bloomberg L.P., 808 F. Supp. 2d 634, 638 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
127 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
128 Harper, 471 U.S. at 556. 
129 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (defining copyright fair use). 
130 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting Stewart v. 
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)). 
131 17 U.S.C. § 107.  Parody and satire are defenses to copyright infringement included in 
18
Touro Law Review, Vol. 29 [2013], No. 4, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/7
2013] DETERMINING THE LOCATION OF INJURY 1043 
fore, even the limitations on copyrights’ protections are designed to 
maximize production of creative works, not a source of protection for 
all actual economic loss. 
Perhaps the strongest support for construing the location of 
injury at the copyright holder’s domicile is based on remedies the 
Copyright Act provides for infringement.  The typical remedy for 
copyright infringement is an injunction.132  Pursuant to section 502 of 
the Copyright Act, courts are given broad discretion in granting in-
junctions to halt infringement.133  In the past, the irreparable harm to 
a plaintiff, which is required for an injunction, was presumed by the 
courts upon a showing of success on the merits.134  However, the Su-
preme Court’s holding in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,135 that 
permanent injunctions may not be categorically granted for patent in-
fringement without the normal injunction analysis, casts doubt on the 
accepted presumption of irreparable harm in copyright cases.136  Alt-
hough it was a patent case, the Court examined copyright law for in-
struction,137 and its holding applies equally to copyright, as irrepara-
ble harm was historically presumed for each.138 
As a result, the circuits are split on the proper treatment of in-
 
fair use.  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (stating parody may be fair use); Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351, 357 (N.D. Ga. 1979) 
(stating parody and satire are meant to be fair use).  Fair use requires a consideration of: (1) 
the purpose and character of the unconsented use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) 
the quantity and quality of the portion of the work used in light of the entire copyrighted 
work; and (4) the unconsented use’s impact on the value of or prospective market for the 
copyrighted work.  17 U.S.C. § 107. 
132 Silverstein v. Penguin Putnam, Inc., 368 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 2004) (“In many instanc-
es, injunctive relief may be the best or only way to preserve the exclusivity of a copyright.”). 
133 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2012); WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 285 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(issuing an injunction because damages could not adequately restore property value of plain-
tiff’s copyright and actual economic damages were difficult to prove). 
134 See, e.g., ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Stellar Records, Inc., 96 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(“[G]enerally when a copyright plaintiff makes out a prima facie showing of infringement, 
irreparable harm may be presumed.”) (emphasis in original); Richard Feiner & Co., Inc. v. 
Turner Entm’t Co., 98 F.3d 33, 34 (2d Cir. 1996) (“When a plaintiff establishes a prima fa-
cie case of copyright infringement, irreparable harm is presumed.”) (emphasis in original); 
Hasbro Bradley, Inc. v. Sparkle Toys, Inc., 780 F.2d 189, 192 (2d Cir. 1985) (“Irreparable 
harm may ordinarily be presumed from copyright infringement.”) (citations omitted). 
135 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
136 Salinger, 607 F.3d at 77 (“This Court has not directly addressed the scope of eBay.  
And district courts in our Circuit have split on eBay’s reach.”) (footnote omitted). 
137 eBay, 547 U.S. at 393-94. 
138 Gene Bolmarcich, Wrongs Without Remedies—eBay to Apple, THE SUFFOLK LAWYER, 
Oct. 2012, at 1 (“Although eBay involved patents, the reasoning of the Supreme Court 
seemed applicable to both copyright and trademark cases.”). 
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junction analysis for copyright and trademark infringement;139 how-
ever, the Second Circuit settled the issue in Salinger v. Colting,140 a 
copyright infringement case.  It held that irreparable harm should not 
be presumed and injunctions should be granted only upon a showing 
that an injury cannot be remedied by monetary damages.141  Although 
irreparable harm is no longer presumed, most infringement cases still 
result in an injunction.142 
This emerging dispute frames the conflicting views of copy-
right infringement remedies; while some courts believe that an ap-
propriate remedy should be based on property law, others believe that 
it should be based on liability law.143  Because property law favors 
allowing the property owner to negotiate and determine what quali-
fies as appropriate consideration for release of a certain right, this 
theory supports liberal issuance of injunctions to allow copyright 
owners to negotiate licenses.144  But, because liability aims to com-
pensate a plaintiff for a loss, it favors awarding monetary damages.145  
Therefore, the courts’ preference of awarding injunctions in copy-
right infringement cases reflects a perception that copyright in-
fringement injury relates to the holder’s control over its property ra-
ther than any actual lost revenue.146 
In addition to the differences associated with injunctive relief, 
the monetary relief available for copyright infringement distinguishes 
the location of injury for such infringement from any lost sales and 
 
139 See Flexible Lifeline Sys., Inc. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 996 (9th Cir. 
2011) (applying eBay in a copyright infringement case); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 653 
F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying eBay in a copyright infringement case); Voice of the 
Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 37 (1st Cir. 2011) (declining 
to apply presumption of irreparable harm).  But see Bethesda Softworks, L.L.C., v. Interplay 
Entm’t Corp., 452 F. App’x 351, 354-55 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying presumption of irrepara-
ble harm for only preliminary injunctions, but eBay for permanent injunctions). 
140 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010). 
141 Id. at 82. 
142 See generally Jake Phillips, Note, Ebay’s Effect on Copyright Injunctions: When Prop-
erty Rules Give Way to Liability Rules, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 405, 420 (2009). 
143 Id. at 423-24. 
144 Id. at 410. 
145 Id. at 412. 
146 It appears that the Second Circuit still has a tendency to grant injunctions.  Kathleen K. 
Olson, Injunctions and the Public Interest in Fair Use Cases After Ebay, 17 COMM. L. & 
POL’Y 235, 255 (2012) (“[T]here is no evidence to show that injunctions are more difficult to 
obtain in federal courts that did not adopt the presumption of irreparable harm and have al-
ways used the four-part test . . . that was re-introduced in patent cases by eBay and to copy-
right cases [in the Second Circuit] by Salinger and Perfect 10.”) (footnote omitted). 
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places the location at the domicile of the copyright holder.  Money 
damages may be awarded in addition to or in place of injunctive re-
lief for copyright.147  Section 504 of the Copyright Act grants courts 
broad discretion in awarding monetary damages, and allows plaintiffs 
to elect actual or statutory damages.148  A plaintiff seeking actual 
damages may recover its losses as compensation for the infringement 
as well as the portion of the defendant’s profits attributable to the in-
fringement, preventing an infringer from unfairly benefiting.149  Thus, 
a copyright holder may suffer a legally actionable injury without ever 
incurring an actual loss when another benefits from an infringement 
of that copyright.150  In addition, due to the inherent difficulty in as-
certaining actual economic loss resulting from an infringement, plain-
tiffs may recover statutory damages without presenting any evidence 
of actual economic loss.151  Courts which award statutory damages 
typically award the fair market value of a license for the defendant’s 
particular use of the protected work, known as a compulsory li-
cense.152  This compulsory license view once again supports the no-
tion that the injury is a violation of a holder’s property right, not a 
copyright holder’s lost business, whereas the liability theory is based 
on a plaintiff’s lost business.  Thus, conceptualizing the location of 
injury at the location of download or upload conflicts with the gen-
eral concepts of copyright infringement injury. 
Further, as in Penguin, injunctive relief is granted liberally in 
copyright infringement cases because it is difficult, if at all possible, 
to show loss of sales.153  Thus, the court’s acknowledgment of the in-
 
147 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2012); NIMMER, supra note 115, at § 14.06(B)(1)(a). 
148 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012). 
149 NIMMER, supra note 115, at § 14.01 (“[T]he copyright owner . . . ‘is entitled to recover 
the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of 
the infringer that are attributable to the infringement . . . .’ ” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) 
(2006))); see also On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 159, 176 (2d Cir. 2001) (award-
ing both measures of damages). 
150 Washington Shoe Co. v. A-Z Sporting Goods Inc., No. 11-35166, 2012 WL 6582345, 
at *8 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 2012) (stating infringement injures a holder based on the weakening 
of the holder’s control over his work). 
151 See, e.g., Island Software & Computer Serv., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 413 F.3d 257, 
262-63 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating statutory damages may be awarded with no evidence of actual 
economic loss).  A plaintiff may elect statutory damages, which range from $750-$30,000, at 
any time prior to final judgment.  17 U.S.C. § 504(c); Island Software, 413 F.3d at 262-63 
(2d Cir. 2005) (stating the “court will grant anywhere between $750 and $30,000 for each 
copyright infringed” in awarding statutory damages). 
152 Davis, 246 F.3d at 166 n.5. 
153 Penguin, 946 N.E.2d at 164 (citing Salinger, 607 F.3d at 81)). 
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herent difficulty of ascertaining actual economic loss from infringe-
ment renders its earlier consideration of the difficulty in ascertaining 
the location of impermissible downloads unnecessary.  Whether the 
infringement occurs over the Internet or not, proving actual economic 
damage has been held by the courts and recognized in the Copyright 
Act’s statutory damages provisions as nearly impossible.154  Further, 
injunctions are issued in infringement cases before actual loss occurs 
because initial loss may result in ongoing severe damage, such as the 
loss of incentive to produce or the belief among the public that the 
work’s copyright has expired and is in the public domain.155  Thus, 
consideration of the locations of downloads is imprudent because it 
may cause harm that an injunction would have avoided. 
Thus, it was gratuitous for the New York Court of Appeals to 
have reformulated the Second Circuit’s question.  The court’s limited 
holding does not provide as much instruction as it could have.  By re-
formulating the question, the court avoided settling the issue as to the 
location of injury for copyright infringement that does not involve the 
Internet.156 
B.  A Comparison of the Core Concepts of Trademark 
and Copyright Law 
A review of the court’s reasoning in Penguin reveals a greater 
issue than the court’s unwarranted inclusion of the Internet in its 
analysis.  The court opened the door to application of Penguin to 
trademark infringement disputes.  Therefore, this Note will examine 
the core concepts of trademark law to demonstrate the flaws and risks 
in this aspect of the court’s reasoning.  This is particularly important 
because courts have frequently decided cases without clearly differ-
entiating trademark and copyright law.157  In fact, other courts in 
trademark cases have relied on Penguin since it was decided.158 
 
154 Penguin, 946 N.E.2d at 164. 
155 Sony Corp. of Amer. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 479 (1984). 
156 See Penguin, 946 N.E.2d at 161 (noting a split in the lower courts’ application of 
CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) to all copyright infringement cases). 
157 See McGraw-Hill Cos. v. Ingenium Techs. Corp., 375 F. Supp. 2d 252, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (“The torts of copyright and trademark infringement cause injury in the state where 
the allegedly infringed intellectual property is held . . . .”) (citation omitted); see also Design 
Tex, 2005 WL 357125, at *1 (“[P]laintiffs (and their intellectual property) are based in New 
York, the injury is felt within the state no matter where the infringement takes place.”) (cita-
tion omitted). 
158 See Mrs. U.S. Nat. Pageant, Inc. v. Miss U.S. Org., LLC, 875 F. Supp. 2d 211 
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Trademark law, governed by the Lanham Act,159 protects any 
“word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof,” used in 
commerce to identify the source of a product and distinguish it from 
similar products.
 160  Copyright and trademark share formalistic char-
acteristics such as the fact that both are primarily governed by federal 
statute161 and that both provide additional benefits to owners who na-
tionally register their works or marks.162  More importantly, both 
share substantive traits due to their conceptual similarity: ownership 
of a copyright or trademark is a right of exclusive use, analogous to 
property.163  However, the laws also have clear distinctions as a result 
of their divergent purposes: copyrights encourage creative develop-
ments by authors and merely use economic incentive as a tool;164 
trademarks aim to “promote competition and the maintenance of 
product quality,”165 a purely economic concept.166  Trademark’s ob-
ligatory link to monetary gain or loss is unlike any link between cop-
yright and economic value. 
Just as copyright law confers on owners a monopoly use right, 
trademark law also provides owners with an exclusive use right, and 
 
(W.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding jurisdiction in a trademark infringement case based on Penguin). 
159 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (2012). 
160 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).  Courts have extended trademark protection to color and 
sound.  See Jerome Gilson & Anne Gilson LaLonde, Cinnamon Buns, Marching Ducks and 
Cherry-Scented Racecar Exhaust: Protecting Nontraditional Trademarks, 95 TRADEMARK 
REP. 773, 774 (2005) (discussing the various marks that are protectable); see also Qualitex 
Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (protecting color). 
161 PAUL GOLDSTEIN & R. ANTHONY REESE, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND 
RELATED STATE DOCTRINES, 680-81 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 7th ed. 2012); NIMMER, su-
pra note 115, at § TL; Alina Ng, Literary Property and Copyright, 10 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 531, 531 (2012).  Trademark law is governed predominantly by federal law, 
pursuant to the Lanham Act, while state law governs unregistered marks and antidilution.  15 
U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 6:14 (4th ed. 2012). 
162 Although not required, authors may register their works with the Copyright Office and 
may register their trademarks with the Patent and Trademark Office.  17 U.S.C. § 408 
(2012); 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1).  Registration within five years of a work’s first publication 
is a prima facie showing of a valid copyright and is required for the Act’s attorney’s fees 
provision.  17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2012); 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2012).  Trademark registration acts 
as a presumption of ownership, while unregistered marks require prior use in commerce.  15 
U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1). 
163 See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 161, at § 6:14 (discussing similarities and differ-
ences of copyright and trademark). 
164 Id. 
165 Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193 (1985). 
166 See id. (stating trademark law’s aim); Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 508 F.2d 
1260, 1265 (5th Cir. 1975). 
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thus the right to exclude use by others.167  The court’s analysis of 
copyright’s special bundle of rights in Penguin provided only two ex-
amples of these rights, one of which was a copyright owner’s right to 
exclude.168  Further, the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay, cited by 
the court in Penguin to illustrate a copyright holder’s right to exclude, 
has been applied to both trademark and copyright cases.169 
However, the extent of each body of law’s right to exclude is 
very different; thus, the notions of injury caused by a violation of 
each right give rise to strikingly dissimilar causes of action for in-
fringement.  Trademark infringement is a use of identical or similar 
marks in commerce that is likely to confuse consumers as to the 
source of a product or service.170  A plaintiff must show that it owns 
the mark and customer confusion is likely to result from the specific 
use of that mark by another.171  Likelihood of customer confusion is 
the cornerstone of trademark infringement.172  Although each circuit 
has developed its own test for consumer confusion, the tests are ex-
tremely similar and all focus on the effect of a particular use of a 
mark on the public.173  This is unlike copyright infringement analysis, 
which focuses only on the parties and their works, not the public’s 
reaction to an unconsented copying.174  Thus, trademark infringement 
only occurs once customer confusion is likely or has occurred,175 but 
copyright infringement occurs immediately at the time of copying, 
 
167 Park ‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198. 
168 Penguin, 946 N.E.2d at 163-64. 
169 Id. (citing eBay, 547 U.S. at 392); Bolmarcich, supra note 138, at 1. 
170 Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Lanham Act Trademark Infringement Actions in 
Internet and Website Context, 197 A.L.R. FED. 17 (2004). 
171 Tana v. Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d 767, 773 (11th Cir. 2010). 
172 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 120 (2004). 
173 Generally, courts consider: (1) the similarity of the marks, (2) the similarity of the 
products the marks are used with, (3) the similarity of the parties’ sales methods and market-
ing channels, (4) the degree of care exercised by purchasers, (5) the sophistication of con-
sumers, (6) the likelihood the original user will enter the junior user’s market, (7) evidence of 
actual confusion, and (8) the defendant’s intent.  See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci 
Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 1994) (providing six consumer confusion factors); 
Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 
1981) (assessing likelihood of confusion factors); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 
341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979) (providing factors for determining customer confusion); Polar-
oid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (providing likelihood of 
consumer confusion “variables”). 
174 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2012). 
175 KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 124 (stating infringement does not occur until proof of a 
likelihood of customer confusion). 
24
Touro Law Review, Vol. 29 [2013], No. 4, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/7
2013] DETERMINING THE LOCATION OF INJURY 1049 
regardless of the public’s reaction.176 
In further distinction, registration is a prerequisite to a copy-
right, but not trademark, infringement claim.177  If a trademark is not 
registered, a user may prove ownership by previous use in commerce; 
failure to use a mark in commerce, even if registered or previously 
used, may result in forfeiture of ownership or abandonment.178  Be-
cause the public’s association of a trademark with a product’s source 
is developed by relying on the mark for purchasing decisions, which 
in turn provides sales and economic gain to the mark owner, essen-
tially, a mark’s economic value must be proven to state a claim for 
infringement.  Further, registration is not required because prior use 
in commerce gives notice of the trademark’s ownership.  But, be-
cause copyrights protect even works that the public has little or no 
awareness of and works with no monetary value, registration is need-
ed to provide notice of ownership. 
Further, because trademark infringement protects customers 
from accidentally purchasing a product affixed with a competitor’s 
trademark instead of that mark owner’s product, which inevitably 
would cause the owner to lose revenue, essentially, trademark in-
fringement is dependent on actual or likely economic injury.  There-
fore, the injury infringement causes to a trademark owner is linked 
directly to the customers that observe the infringing use and the lost 
sales resulting from that observation.  But, the injury infringement 
causes to a copyright is linked to the expansive right to control an 
original work.179  Therefore, in conceptualizing the location of injury 
for infringement, copyright should focus on the location of the copy-
right holder while trademark infringement should focus on the loca-
tion of infringement. 
In contrast to the strikingly different forms of infringement in 
copyright and trademark law, trademark law protects holders and the 
 
176 See NIMMER, supra note 115, at § 8.01(g) (discussing the time infringement occurs). 
177 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (providing registration is a prerequisite to a copyright infringement 
claim); see Thompson Med. Co., v. Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating 
infringement applies “whether or not a [trademark is] registered . . . .”).  On March 1, 1989, 
Section 411(a) was amended to eliminate the registration requirement for works produced in 
foreign countries which are parties to certain international copyright treaties, most notably, 
the Berne Convention.  17 U.S.C. § 411(a). 
178 15 U.S.C. § 1127.  Abandonment is not automatic; non-use must be coupled with ei-
ther the owner’s intent to discontinue use for the “reasonably foreseeable future,” or the 
mark’s loss of distinctiveness.  Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 45, 46 (2d Cir. 1989). 
179 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 464 (discussing the harm of a single impermissible copy of a 
registered work). 
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value of their marks, like copyright law, by protecting against dilu-
tion of famous marks in two ways: tarnishment and blurring.180  
Tarnishment is an “association arising from the similarity between a 
mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of 
the famous mark.”181  Blurring is the use of a mark similar to a fa-
mous mark that reduces the famous mark’s distinctiveness.182  Unlike 
trademark infringement, a plaintiff may state a claim for dilution re-
gardless of the likelihood another mark will confuse consumers as to 
a product’s source.183  In addition, trademark infringement is general-
ly limited to disputes between competitors in the same industry, but 
dilution does not require any market commonality.184  Thus, copy-
right infringement and trademark dilution protect the intangible prop-
erty, the right of exclusive use, regardless of the public’s perception. 
The protections granted by copyright and trademark law are 
limited to preserve the public’s interests.  In terms of subject matter, 
copyright excludes ideas and facts to prevent a copyright from sti-
fling the development of the arts by authors that benefit from access 
to protected works, which is not related to any commercial or eco-
nomic consideration.185  This is unlike trademark law’s prohibition of  
monopoly use of a mark which limits society’s access to functional or 
descriptive product elements, such as generic marks.186  Once again 
 
180 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012); Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 
97, 105 (2d Cir. 2009). 
181 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C). 
182 Id.  Blurring requires a consideration of: (i) the extent of similarity between the famous 
mark and the junior mark, (ii) the famous mark’s level of distinctiveness, (iii) the exclusive 
use of the famous mark which the owner is engaging in, (iv) the degree of public recognition 
of the famous mark, (v) the junior mark user’s intent to associate with the famous mark, and 
(vi) evidence of actual association between the two marks.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i-vi). 
183 See Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis 
for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789 (1997) (distinguishing trademark in-
fringement and dilution). 
184 Id. 
185 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); Harper, 471 U.S. at 556. 
186 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164-65.  Arbitrary or fanciful marks, which are marks with no 
previous association to a product it is used with, and suggestive marks, which are marks that 
only mention an ingredient or characteristic of a product, are per se protectable.  Abercrom-
bie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-12 (2d Cir. 1976).  A mark that is de-
scriptive of a product is protectable only if it is distinctive, which requires a showing of sec-
ondary meaning.  15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2012).  Secondary 
meaning occurs when the public primarily associates the specific mark owner, not the prod-
uct type in general, with the mark.  Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 10.  A generic mark is 
one that is synonymous with a product, not a particular source, and is never protectable; a 
mark can become generic and lose protection over time.  Id. at 9-10.  No mark that is decep-
tive of the product it is used in connection with is protectable.  15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012).  
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trademark focuses on consumers. 
In addition, the Copyright Act and the Lanham Act both pro-
vide a defense for fair use.187  Whereas copyright fair use encourages 
“courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on 
occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed 
to foster,”188 trademark fair use focuses on the use of a mark’s effect 
on consumers in two forms of fair use: classic fair use and nomina-
tive fair use.189  Classic fair use permits non-owners to use a regis-
tered mark to accurately describe their own product.190  Nominative 
fair use allows the use of another’s protected mark to identify that 
mark owner or its product so long as it is not likely to cause consum-
ers to falsely believe the mark holder is the product’s source, affiliate, 
or sponsor.191 
Further limitations on the extent of trademark protection also 
indicate its link to consumers.  Trademark monopolies are limited in 
scope by geography192 and industry.193  Thus, multiple entities may 
 
A mark that is “deceptively misdescriptive” of the product it is linked to is only protectable 
with a showing of acquired distinctiveness.  15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f).  
But a mark that is “primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive” is never protecta-
ble, regardless of its distinctiveness.  15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(3); 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f). 
187 17 U.S.C. § 107 (defining copyright fair use); 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2012) (stating 
trademark fair use). 
188 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (quoting Stewart, 495 U.S. at 207) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
189 New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(discussing difference between classic and nominative fair use in trademark law). 
190 Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1995) (clas-
sic fair use “allows a competitor to use another’s registered trademark to describe aspects of 
one’s own goods” (quoting Mattel, Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway Int’l, Inc., 724 F.2d 357, 361 (2d 
Cir.1983))). 
191 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The doctrine of nom-
inative fair use allows ‘[a] defendant [to] use a plaintiff’s trademark to identify the plaintiff's 
goods so long as there is no likelihood of confusion about the source of [the] defendant’s 
product or the mark-holder’s sponsorship or affiliation.’ ” (quoting Merck & Co. v. 
Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2006))); New Kids on 
the Block, 971 F.2d at 308 (“[W]here the defendant uses a trademark to describe the plain-
tiff’s product, rather than its own, we hold that a commercial user is entitled to a nominative 
fair use defense . . . .”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 
225-26 (3d Cir. 2005) (defining nominative fair use). 
192 See Patsy’s Italian Rest., Inc. v. Banas, 658 F.3d 254, 266 (2d Cir. 2011) (discussing 
concurrent use of the same mark by two different companies due to the geographic limitation 
of the trademark owner’s monopoly); Brennan’s, Inc. v. Brennan’s Rest., L.L.C., 360 F.3d 
125, 135 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing likelihood of consumer confusion caused by use of a 
mark which acquired secondary meaning in a limited geographic area). 
193 Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 
1989) (allowing non-competitor mark use). 
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use the same or similar marks concurrently, without causing in-
fringement.194  Using traditional marketing and advertising methods, 
two products that use the same mark in different geographic areas are 
not likely to be seen by the same consumers, and thus are unlikely to 
confuse any potential customers.195  Likewise, the use of identical or 
similar marks in different industries with different consumers is un-
likely to cause customer confusion.196  In contrast, a copyright’s mo-
nopoly has no regional boundaries for any uses, commercial or oth-
erwise, regardless of the region or industry in which the owner does 
business.197 
Moreover, the limit on a copyright’s right of exclusive use 
distances the notion of injury from trademark’s strictly economic 
concept.  Copyright’s protections are limited in time.198 Trademark’s 
protections may last perpetually, as long as the owner continues to 
use the mark in commerce, thus preserving its economic value.199  
Thus, a single copyright infringement may lead to ongoing injury if 
the public incorrectly believes the work has entered the public do-
main, but no such belief is reasonable for a trademark.200  Therefore, 
copyright law requires a broader notion of injury to deter even a sin-
gle infringement. 
As an additional similarity, the typical remedy for a success-
ful trademark infringement claim is also an injunction.201  Pursuant to 
the Lanham Act, courts are given broad discretion in granting injunc-
 
194 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2012). 
195 See, e.g., Brennan’s, 360 F.3d at 135 (finding no likelihood of confusion because of 
geographic separation).  However, registration provides an owner with a geographic monop-
oly (but isn’t a remedy subject to a showing of likelihood of confusion?).  Id. at 134.  For a 
discussion on the Internet’s effect on traditional geographic and industry limitations of a 
trademark’s monopoly, see discussion infra page 1055. 
196 See, e.g., Mead Data Cent., 875 F.2d at 1031-32 (finding no likelihood of confusion in 
separate industries). 
197 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (stating a copyright owner’s exclusive rights); see also Harper, 
471 U.S. at 546 (“Section 106 of the Copyright Act confers a bundle of exclusive rights to 
the owner of the copyright.”) (footnote omitted). 
198 17 U.S.C. § 302; Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 885 (2012) (discussing copyright 
law’s most recent term limits). 
199 Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 115 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that 
“trademark rights can be forever”). 
200 Congress recognized the possible harm from a single infringement and enacted a single 
infringement statutory damages provision.  17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).  See Campbell, 510 U.S. 
at 586 (stating copyright infringement may cause consumers to believe a work is no longer 
protected). 
201 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (2012). 
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tions to halt infringement.202  Just like copyrights, historically the 
Circuits presumed irreparable harm upon a showing of success on the 
merits.203  And, just as eBay cast doubt on this presumption and Sal-
inger settled the issue in copyright law, courts have applied eBay and 
Salinger to preliminary as well as permanent injunctions and in all 
intellectual property cases, including trademark.204  This is another 
example of how courts commonly compare trademark and copyright 
law.  Although irreparable harm is no longer presumed, most in-
fringement cases still result in an injunction.205  But the reasons 
courts generally grant injunctions in copyright and trademark in-
fringement cases are not the same and reflect deep conceptual distinc-
tions.  In trademark cases, injunctions are primarily granted because 
of the inherent difficulty in calculating the damage to an owner’s 
business.  This fact welcomes application of Penguin to trademark 
cases because the court stated that the difficulty in calculating dam-
ages supported its holding in the copyright infringement case.206  
However, as was pointed out earlier, copyright cases often result in 
injunctions under a property theory, not simply due to the difficulty 
in calculating damages.  Therefore, the court’s reasoning in Penguin 
is actually more applicable to trademark cases than copyright cases. 
Furthermore, money damages may be awarded in addition to 
or in place of injunctive relief for copyright or trademark infringe-
ment.  The Lanham Act provides monetary relief to infringed trade-
mark holders;207 the governing law considers a hodgepodge of factors 
 
202 See id. (describing available injunctive relief); Roederer v. J. Garcia Carrión, S.A., 732 
F. Supp. 2d 836, 881 (D. Minn. 2010) (finding that a permanent injunction is necessary). 
203 Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Entm’t, Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 35 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Most 
of the case law on this issue involves trademark and copyright disputes, where a presumption 
of irreparable harm arises once a plaintiff establishes a likelihood of success on a claim.”). 
204 See Tecnimed SRL v. Kidz-Med, Inc., 462 F. App’x 31, 32 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating 
there is no longer a presumption of irreparable harm in trademark infringement cases).  But 
see Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 
2009) (“Because the court found a likelihood of success on the merits, it reasonably pre-
sumed irreparable injury.”); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Amouri’s Grand Foods, Inc., 453 F.3d 
377, 381-82 (6th Cir. 2006) (“As to irreparable harm, our Circuit requires no particular find-
ing of its likelihood to support injunctive relief . . . when a likelihood of confusion or possi-
ble risk to reputation appears from infringement . . . .”) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
205 Phillips, supra note 142, at 420. 
206 Penguin, 946 N.E.2d at 164. 
207 15 U.S.C. § 1171 (2012); see, e.g., Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VEB Carl Zeiss Jena, 433 
F.2d 686, 706-07 (2d Cir. 1970) (denying monetary relief in favor of an injunction); Maier 
Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117, 120 (9th Cir. 1968) (“The equi-
table limitation upon the granting of monetary awards under the Lanham Act . . . make[s] it 
clear that such a remedy should not be granted as a matter of right.”). 
29
Josephs: Determining the Location of Injury
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
1054 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
differing in each circuit.208  Most frequently, monetary relief takes the 
form of damages and is measured by either the plaintiff’s proven loss 
in sales or the decrease in its business’s value resulting from the in-
fringement.209  At other times, monetary relief is measured by the de-
fendant’s profits, but usually as a presumption of the plaintiff’s lost 
sales, not as punishment for the defendant’s unjust enrichment.210  
Because proving an actual economic loss caused by an infringement 
is nearly impossible, the majority of courts, including the Second 
Circuit,211 but not all,212 require a showing of actual customer confu-
sion or deception for awarding monetary damages.213  This implies 
that a trademark causes injury at the location that consumers observe 
the purportedly infringing use of a mark and become confused, not at 
the location of the trademark holder.  However, the court in Penguin 
relied on the difficulty of calculating actual damage for copyright in-
fringement, thereby encouraging analogy to trademark infringement. 
In sum, the court in Penguin relied on copyright holders’ right 
to exclude and the difficulty in calculating actual economic loss.  
This is not incorrect, but it is an overly broad expression of copy-
right’s exclusive use rights that also touches on its similarities with 
 
208 See generally David S. Almeling, The Infringement-Plus-Equity Model: A Better Way 
To Award Monetary Relief in Trademark Cases, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 205, 209 (2007) (dis-
cussing monetary relief for trademark infringement); MCCARTHY, supra note 161, at § 
30:58. 
209 Id. 
210 See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 136 (1937); GOLDSTEIN, supra 
note 161, at 333.  In limited cases, courts have awarded damages based on the cost to the 
mark owner in repairing its goodwill.  See, e.g., Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1375 (10th Cir. 1977). 
211 See George Basch Co., Inc. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1537 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(“[I]t is well settled that in order for a Lanham Act plaintiff to receive an award of damages 
the plaintiff must prove either ‘actual consumer confusion or deception resulting from the 
violation.’ ” (quoting Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Island Transp. Corp., 878 F.2d 650, 655 (2d 
Cir.1989))). 
212 See, e.g., Gracie v. Gracie, 217 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000) (“While actual confu-
sion may be relevant as evidence of the likelihood of confusion . . . actual confusion is not 
necessary to obtain a recovery . . . .”); Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 855 F.2d 779, 781 (11th 
Cir. 1988) (“[T]he law in this Circuit is well settled that a plaintiff need not demonstrate ac-
tual damage . . . under § 35 of the Lanham Act.”) (citations omitted). 
213 See, e.g., Zelinski v. Columbia 300, Inc., 335 F.3d 633, 639 (7th Cir. 2003) (requiring 
plaintiff to show evidence of actual confusion and actual economic loss); Res. Developers, 
Inc. v. Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Found., Inc., 926 F.2d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 1991) (“When 
a plaintiff seeks money damages . . . under section 43(a), the plaintiff must introduce evi-
dence of actual consumer confusion.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 36 
cmt. i (1995) (monetary relief for infringement “requires proof that some consumers have 
actually been confused or deceived.”). 
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trademark law.  A more in depth analysis of each law reveals that 
these comparisons may be misplaced and unwise. 
C.  The Internet’s Effect on Copyright and Trademark 
Law 
This Section examines the effects of the Internet on the rela-
tionship between trademark and copyright law.  This analysis shows 
that the court’s reformulation of the certified question in Penguin was 
too narrow because it downplayed the significance of copyright’s 
unique bundle of rights and it strengthened the applicability of Pen-
guin to trademark infringement cases.  The court’s reasoning for rely-
ing on the Internet’s role in Penguin applies equally to trademark in-
fringement cases involving the Internet.  Furthermore, although the 
Internet has cast doubt on the effectiveness of traditional protections 
for trademark and copyright holders, the issues raised by the Internet 
have not changed the notion of injury from infringement to a copy-
right holder, while it has fundamentally altered the notion of injury a 
trademark holder suffers from infringement. 
The Internet has acted as the means for a dramatic increase in 
infringement of copyrighted works and protected marks.214  Among 
the approximately two billion Internet users worldwide, an estimated 
seventy-five billion dollars worth of copyrighted material is infringed 
via the Internet annually.215  In fact, copyright piracy has become so 
commonplace that much of society no longer considers it theft.216  In 
addition, as companies increasingly depend on the Internet to convey 
information about their products to consumers and conduct business 
transactions, infringing on a competitor’s protected mark provides 
 
214 See generally John M. Owen, Graduated Response Systems and the Market for Copy-
righted Works, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 559, 559 (2012) (discussing the Internet’s effect on 
copyright); see also Michael S. Mireles, Jr., Towards Recognizing and Reconciling the Mul-
tiplicity of Values and Interests in Trademark Law, 44 IND. L. REV. 427, 487 (2011) (discuss-
ing the Internet and trademark law). 
215 Khaliunaa Garamgaibaatar, Comment, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: 
Copyrights, Intermediaries, and Digital Pirates, 20 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 199 (2011).  
From 2004 to 2009, thirty billion songs were unlawfully downloaded, and music sales 
dropped by fiftythree percent in 2011.  The Scope of the Problem, RIAA (Nov. 2012), 
http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php?content_selector=piracy-online-scope-of-the-problem. 
216 See Fredrick Oduol Oduor, The Internet and Copyright Protection: Are We Producing 
A Global Generation of Copyright Criminals?, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 501, 502 (2011) 
(discussing society’s acceptance of piracy). 
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greater reward.217  Furthermore, because regulation of the Internet is 
lacking compared to most other commercial and communication 
modes, and because the Internet is conceptually new to the courts, 
novel issues as to copyright and trademark protections arise.218 
Websites such as YouTube and Wikipedia allow individuals 
with no computer background to upload material, which is often cop-
yrighted, to the Internet for universal access, known as User Generat-
ed Content.219  Other websites offer peer-to-peer (“P2P”) file sharing, 
such as Napster, Grokster and  BitTorrent, which have been shut 
down.220  P2P does not involve the uploading of a work to a central 
website for universal access; P2P websites make files on their users’ 
computers available to other users to copy.221 
As a result, copyright holders frequently assert claims of sec-
ondary liability, which holds liable entities that knowingly assist oth-
ers in benefiting from infringement, against website providers.222  
Secondary liability has two forms: contributory infringement, the in-
tentional inducement or encouragement of direct infringement by an-
other, and vicarious infringement, the failure to exercise a power to 
stop another’s direct infringement.223  Secondary liability, though, is 
not new to the Internet and has been applied to innovative technology 
 
217 See generally Colby B. Springer, Master of the Domain (Name): A History of Domain 
Name Litigation and the Emergence of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act and 
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 315, 
316 (2001) (discussing the Internet and trademark law). 
218 Oduol, supra note 216, at 503; Springer, supra note 217, at 316. 
219 See generally Michael S. Sawyer, Note, Filters, Fair Use & Feedback: User-
Generated Content Principles and the DMCA, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 363, 367 (2009) (ex-
plaining User Generated Content and copyright infringement). 
220 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 948 (2005) (hold-
ing defendant liable for promoting infringement by providing file sharing platform); A&M 
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding P2P file sharing 
provider liable for infringement); Andrew V. Moshirnia, Giant Pink Scorpions: Fighting Pi-
racy with Novel Digital Rights Management Technology, 23 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 9 (2012) (“Peer-to-Peer (‘P2P’) file sharing services such as Napster and, 
more recently, BitTorrent clients, has (check quote – should be have)allowed users to easily 
obtain and share illegitimate lossless (check?) copies of works.”) (footnote omitted). 
221 Metro-Goldwyn, 545 U.S. at 948; A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1012. 
222 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn, 545 U.S. at 929 (stating the “argument for imposing indirect 
liability” on a P2P web service provider is “powerful”); A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1024 
(finding P2P web service provider liable for contributory and vicarious infringement); see 
also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 
1995) (finding secondary liability and discussing its importance to web service providers 
which allow file sharing). 
223 See Metro-Goldwyn, 545 U.S. at 930 (defining contributory infringement); see also 
Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 (defining vicarious liability). 
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in the past, such as in Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc.,224 in which the defendant manufactured videotape re-
corders capable of copying television programs.225  Thus, despite the 
Internet’s role in increasing the frequency of secondary copyright in-
fringement, the traditional notion of injury associated with infringe-
ment has effectively applied to these cases. 
In addition, Congress has responded to the Internet’s prolifer-
ation of copyright infringement.  In 1998, Congress amended the 
Copyright Act to add the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DMCA”).226  To encourage authors to put their works in digital 
format, the DMCA makes it a crime to circumvent a work’s technical 
infringement safeguards, such as the protection on a DVD that pre-
vents it from being copied to a computer, codifying secondary liabil-
ity for assisting digital piracy.227  Further, the DMCA has safeguards 
for online service providers to encourage the Internet’s use and pro-
vide certainty “with respect to copyright infringement liability 
online.”228  However, to invoke these safeguards, web service provid-
ers must have the “right and ability to control [infringing] activity,” 
or receive financial benefit from the infringing activity,229 the same 
elements of common law secondary infringement.230  Thus, the 
DMCA has codified these previously accepted copyright protection 
concepts. 
Therefore, although an increase in copyright infringement fa-
cilitated by the Internet has necessitated responses from the courts 
 
224 464 U.S. 417. 
225 Id. at 419-20. 
226 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998); 17 
U.S.C. § 512 (2012).  The DMCA was “designed to facilitate the robust development and 
world-wide expansion of electronic commerce, communications, research, development, and 
education in the digital age.”  S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 1-2 (1998). 
227 Garamgaibaatar, supra note 215, at 207; see, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Cor-
ley, 273 F.3d 429, 435 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The DMCA . . . backed with legal sanctions the ef-
forts of copyright owners to protect their works from piracy behind digital walls such as en-
cryption codes or password protections.”). 
228 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2; Kuruvilla J. Olasa, Two Conflicting Approaches to § 
512(C): Io v. Veoh and UMG v. Veoh, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 347, 350 (2010).  Although 
not relevant to the location of injury, Penguin asserted that Buddha’s actions in assuring its 
users that its use of the works was legally permissible violated the DMCA.  Penguin, 2009 
WL 1069158, at *1. 
229 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). 
230 See Garamgaibaatar, supra note 215, at 207 (discussing similarities to secondary liabil-
ity and the DMCA); see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 (providing elements of secondary liabil-
ity). 
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and legislature, classic concepts of infringement have been the basis 
of the issues raised and the driving policies behind the developing 
law.  There is no question that the development of the Internet has al-
lowed potential infringers to pirate protected works with greater ease 
and less cost.231  As a result, copyright holders have increasingly suf-
fered from infringement.232  An infringing party’s use of some other 
means of transmitting a protected work, such as the telephone or 
mail, should not result in less protection than had the infringement 
occurred on the Internet.233 
In contrast, the Internet has not only increased the frequency 
of trademark infringement, but has altered the classic notions of con-
sumer and marketplace, resulting in some circuits discarding factors 
of their likelihood of consumer confusion analysis.234  Because these 
adapted tests reflect the Internet’s unification of historically separate 
markets and marketing channels, which is one reason for the increase 
in infringement, past limitations on protection based on industry and 
geography have become less of an obstacle for trademark owners.235  
Although focus remains on the likelihood of consumer confusion, the 
Internet has also created entirely new forms of infringement, funda-
mentally altering existing law at times in conflict with traditional pro-
tections.236 
For example, “cybersquatting” occurs when one incorporates 
another’s trademark in a domain name or web address.237  Cyber-
 
231 Priti Trivedi, Comment, Writing the Wrong: What the E-Book Industry Can Learn 
from Digital Music’s Mistakes with DRM, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 925, 927 (2010) (discussing the 
ease and low cost of piracy on the Internet). 
232 See In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., Subpoena Enforcement Matter, 393 F.3d 771, 773 
(8th Cir. 2005) (discussing the Internet copyright impact). 
233 Penguin, 2009 WL 1069158, at *4. 
234 Jessica Amber Drew, Recent Development, Death of Dawn Donut: The Demise of 
Concurrent Trademarks, 145 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y, 145, 147-48 (2007) (discussing the 
Internet’s erosion of geographically isolated trademark rights). 
235 See Brookfield Comm’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1058 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (stating relevant consumer confusion factors for Internet trademark infringement 
cases are “the similarity of marks, the relatedness of product offerings, and the overlap in 
marketing and advertising channels”); see also Century 21, 425 F.3d at 225-26 (stating rele-
vant factors are: “(1) the price of the goods and other factors indicative of the care and atten-
tion expected of consumers when making a purchase; (2) the length of time the defendant 
has used the mark without evidence of actual confusion; (3) the intent of the defendant in 
adopting the mark; and (4) the evidence of actual confusion”). 
236 Drew, supra note 234, at 151 (“The Internet Age has also created an entirely new set of 
issues in the realm of . . . trademarks.”) (footnote omitted). 
237 Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(“Cybersquatting involves the registration as domain names of well-known trademarks by 
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squatting often resembles classic infringement, as competitors benefit 
from a mark owner’s reputation by attracting consumers that sought 
the mark owner by using the trademark in a web address or search 
engine.238  But at other times, cybersquatting disputes involve non-
competitors, unlike classic infringement, because many 
cybersquatters sell domain names to mark owners for profit.239  Ini-
tially, courts were unsure if this could cause consumer confusion, as 
the Internet was not yet accepted as a tool for consumers in develop-
ing product expectations and making purchases.240  Over time, courts 
increasingly granted recovery in these situations using anti-dilution 
law, even in classic infringement situations.241  In 1999, Congress fol-
lowed suit and enacted the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection 
Act,242 which holds liable a user of another’s trademark in domain 
names for profit.243 
In addition, the Internet has given rise to infringement from 
the use of “ad words.”244  Internet search engines, such as Google, 
sell advertisement space on their search results pages that are trig-
gered by specified searches, such as a trademark, to target custom-
ers.245  Unlike cybersquatting, ad words have received disparate 
treatment by the circuits, resulting in inconsistent decisions.246  Alt-
hough issues go beyond use in commerce, due to varying interpreta-
tions of trademark’s use in commerce requirement, some circuits re-
quire display of a trademark in a triggered advertisement, but others 
 
non-trademark holders . . . .”). 
238 Panavision Int’l, 141 F.3d at 1319. 
239 See Sporty’s Farm, 202 F.3d at 493 (cybersquatting benefits “non-trademark holders 
who then try to sell the names back to the trademark owners”); see also Cello Holdings, 
L.L.C. v. Lawrence-Dahl Co., 89 F. Supp. 2d 464, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (involving defend-
ant accused of “blackmailing” a domain name). 
240 See, e.g., Primedia Intertec Corp. v. Tech. Mktg. Corp., 35 F. Supp. 2d 809, 822 (D. 
Kan. 1998) (holding use of trademark in domain was not likely to cause confusion because 
products sold on website were not similar to mark owner’s). 
241 See Panavision Int’l, 141 F.3d at 1325 (holding defendant’s sale of domain names con-
stituted use in commerce); see also TOYS “R” US, Inc. v. Abir, 97 CIV. 8673 JGK, 1999 
WL 61817, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1999) (holding cybersquatter liable for trademark dilution 
by blurring). 
242 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2012). 
243 Id. 
244 See generally M. Lee Taft, Comment, Out of Sight, Out of Mind? Why the Lanham Act 
Needs to Be Brought into the Digital Millennium, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 755, 760 (2012) 
(discussing ad word trademark infringement). 
245 See, e.g., Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 
1142 (9th Cir. 2011). 
246 Taft, supra note 244, at 760-61. 
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have held an advertisement designed to generate sales constitutes use 
in commerce in itself.247 
The responses to the proliferation of the Internet in trademark 
law seem appropriate in context but seem inconsistent with the under-
lying purpose of trademark law.  Generally, courts adapted to provide 
trademark owners with greater protection.  However, in many cir-
cumstances this has eroded accepted limitations on a mark owner’s 
right of exclusive use, limiting the availability of marks, which hin-
ders a company’s ability to distinguish its product, and thus adversely 
affects competition.  First, because many non-competing companies 
use similar Internet marketing channels, such as search engines, and 
because application of anti-dilution protection has expanded dramati-
cally, like it has for cybersquatting, a mark owner’s right of exclusive 
use now extends across industries.248  Second, the Internet’s ubiqui-
tous and borderless marketplace has rendered the physical location of 
a mark owner or Internet consumer irrelevant because consumers in 
all locations may view, and thus be confused by, an improper use of a 
trademark.
 249  As a result, entrants to a market trying to launch a 
business may be precluded from using marks that were historically 
available for concurrent use due to regional distances.250 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Note demonstrates that the court’s holding in Penguin 
was correct, but the court’s reformulation of the issue to apply only to 
cases of unconsented uploading of a copyrighted work to the Internet 
was unnecessary.  First, a typical personal jurisdiction analysis fre-
quently requires a multilayered consideration of the Internet to meet 
some of the federal requirements and the requirements of New 
 
247 Compare Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Va. 
2004) (triggering advertisement by the search of a trademark constituted use in commerce), 
with Merck & Co., 425 F. Supp. 2d at 415 (holding advertisement triggered by a trademark 
was not use in commerce because the advertisement did not display trademark). 
248 See Coffee Dan’s, Inc. v. Coffee Don’s Charcoal Broiler, 305 F. Supp. 1210, 1217 n.13 
(N.D. Cal. 1969) (“[W]e feel constrained not to give [dilution] overly broad application lest 
it swallow up all competition . . . .”); see also Klieger, supra note 183, at 789 (discussing the 
anti-competitive effect of overly expanding protection). 
249 Drew, supra note 234, at 151 (discussing the Internet’s erosion of geographically iso-
lated trademark rights). 
250 See Mireles, supra note 214, at 487 (“[E]rosion of the Dawn Donut rule harms the abil-
ity of new entrants to establish themselves in markets when a competitor is operating in a 
remote market and has an Internet presence.”). 
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York’s long-arm statute.  This shows the court’s consideration of the 
Internet in Penguin was duplicative.  Second, an examination of the 
traditional concepts underlying federal copyright law demonstrates 
that the nature of a copyright itself suggests infringement causes inju-
ry in the holder’s domicile and the Internet has not changed the tradi-
tional notion of injury.  Third, the court’s discussion of copyright law 
in Penguin welcomes the application of Penguin to trademark cases 
in the future because it did not distinguish copyright from any other 
intellectual property; however, a deeper analysis reveals significant 
distinctions, especially regarding the Internet, between copyright and 
trademark law, which indicates application of Penguin is ill-advised. 
Therefore, the New York Court of Appeals should not have 
reformulated the certified question posed to it, and it should have 
ruled, as it did but more broadly, that the location of injury caused by 
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